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The Return of George Sutherland is neither a legal history
nor a biography, though it would fare well as either. It is, rather,
a primer on constitutional jurisprudence, a guidebook for jurists
who would restore a sense of the proper limits on the federal gov-
ernment, which for Hadley Arkes are conservatives as that term
is currently used. Professor Arkes provides this primer under the
guise of recovering the correct understanding of the jurispru-
dence of George Sutherland, Associate Justice on the Supreme
Court from 1922 until 1938.
Professor Arkes's first task is to demonstrate that much of
contemporary jurisprudence-both liberal and conservative-can
trace its pedigree to the opinions and principles of Justice
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Sutherland. The task is not an easy one, since Sutherland has
been much maligned by historians as one of the infamous "Four
Horsemen" who resisted the New Deal even after Chief Justice
Hughes's "switch in time that saved nine" (p 23). Yet overcoming
the revisionism of the historians is but a mild endeavor compared
to the theoretical hurdle Arkes faces. For, as Arkes demonstrates
in the early pages of this book, contemporary conservative ju-
rists-the political heirs to Sutherland's opposition to the New
Deal-have rejected the natural rights principles of Sutherland's
jurisprudence and have instead adopted the legal positivism of
Justice Hugo Black (p 27). And contemporary liberal jurists, for
their part, have rejected the premises of natural rights jurispru-
dence, even while grounding their own decisions in an appeal to
its logic (p 28).
After making a case for taking Sutherland's jurisprudence
seriously, Arkes leads us on a tour of the depths of that jurispru-
dence. Through this tour, Arkes forces us to assess the logical
coherence of the contemporary jurisprudence that finds authority
in Sutherland's work. In this assessment Arkes is highly critical
of contemporary jurists, both liberal and conservative. One sus-
pects throughout the book that Arkes does not hold conservative
and liberal jurists in equal regard, however, and in the end,
Arkes offers a path to logical coherence for conservatives, but
merely derides liberals for the fundamental inconsistencies that
lie at the heart of their jurisprudence.
I. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO
CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE
Historians dubbed them the Four Horsemen-Justices
George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds, and
Pierce Butler-and with that literary allusion license was given
to view their work as nothing more than the product of "four
cranky, conservative judges" who opposed the New Deal (p 23).
Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recounted the common percep-
tion as follows:
The four stalwarts differ among themselves in temperament.
I think that Mr. Justice Butler knows just what he is up to
and that he is playing God or Lucifer to keep the world from
going the way he does not want it to. Sutherland seems to
me a naive, doctrinaire person who really does not know the
world as it is. His incompetence in economic reasoning is
amazing when one contrasts it with the excellence of his his-
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torical and legal.... Mr. Justice McReynolds is a tempes-
tuous cad, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter an old dodo (p
24).1
Even today this perception remains. One of Judge Robert Bork's
critics, for example, sought to bolster his opposition to Bork's
nomination to the Supreme Court by ascribing to Bork the same
lack of "humility and compassion and understanding... [and]
statesmanship" that was characteristic, in his view, of the "Four
Horsemen" (p 25).2
Arkes demonstrates that this perception is wrong on two
accounts. First, the opposition to the most far reaching aspects of
the New Deal came not just from the Four Horsemen, but from a
unanimous or near-unanimous Court: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp v United States,3 for example, struck down the National
Industrial Recovery Act and its "codes of fair competition" as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and as beyond
the authority granted to Congress through the Commerce Clause;
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v Radford4 struck down the
Frazier-Lemke Act, through which Congress had sought to pre-
vent farm foreclosures by, essentially, dispossessing creditors of
their legal claims; Humphrey's Executor v United States5 cur-
tailed the President's power to remove members of independent
regulatory commissions; and Panama Refining Co. v Ryan'
struck down an executive order that prohibited the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of "hot oil"--that is, oil produced in
excess of legally established quotas (p 23).
Arkes asserts that the New Deal's central planners largely
lost the fight over their agenda because of these decisions (p 50).
Our own world, however, is so full of government regulations
that Arkes's assertion leaves us to ponder what the world would
have been like had the New Deal's planners won! "The nature of
[Sutherland's accomplishment in opposing the New Deal] must
ever be obscured," Arkes tells us, "so long as we have only a dim
awareness of the path that was not taken" (p 50). He admonishes
us to make the effort to become aware of the alternative that
Quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval 457 (Houghton Mifflin
1960), quoting letter from T.R. Powell to J.N. Ulman (Jan 27, 1937).
2 Quoting Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative
Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L Rev 127, 133-34 (1987) (alteration in original).
3 295 US 495, 537 (1935) (unanimous).
295 US 555, 601-02 (1935) (unanimous).
' 295 US 602, 629 (1935) (unanimous).
6 293 US 388, 406, 433 (1935) (only Justice Cardozo dissenting).
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might have been, however, because it "has never been entirely
repressed: Many features of control have indeed become incorpo-
rated in our lives through such familiar devices as 'zoning' and
the authority of local governments in 'land-use planning" (p 50).
Second, Arkes reminds us that the obscurity to which histori-
ans have relegated Sutherland and his colleagues masks a body
of jurisprudence to which both contemporary liberals and contem-
porary conservatives are indebted. Perhaps the most notable
recent example of the reach of Sutherland's jurisprudence is the
legal battle over the constitutionality of the independent counsel
in the Iran-Contra affair. Each side found support for its position
in the opinions of George Sutherland: "The defenders of the Exec-
utive power found themselves summoning the words of
Sutherland in [United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp].
And on the other side, those who sought to limit the President's
powers found themselves summoning the words of Sutherland in
Humphrey's Executor"8 (p 35).
Yet neither side completely understood the full measure of
Sutherland's opinions. The majority opinion in Morrison v
Olson,9 which upheld the constitutionality of the independent
counsel, failed to account for the fact that in Humphrey's Execu-
tor, Sutherland had not overruled Myers v United States," an
opinion which he himself had joined, but rather had distin-
guished it (p 181). Myers held unconstitutional an attempt by
Congress, over presidential objection, to prevent the President
from removing, at his pleasure, an official exercising purely exec-
utive functions." In Humphrey's Executor, by contrast, the
Court rejected presidential authority to remove an official of an
independent commission that had been established with the full
concurrence of both Congress and the President, and that exer-
cised quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. 2
The distinctions between the two cases weigh heavily against
the majority's reasoning in Olson. No President, according to
Arkes, ever embraced the independent-counsel law in the way
that President Wilson actively supported the creation of indepen-
dent agencies (p 193). More fundamentally, the independent
counsel exercised powers that could hardly be more executive in
7 299 US 304 (1936).
8 295 US 602.
9 487 US 654, 696-97 (1988).
10 272 US 52 (1926).
" Id at 176.
12 295 US at 631-32.
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nature; discretion over prosecutions lies at the very core of execu-
tive power, as Justice Scalia stated so forcefully in his dissent. 3
Defenders of the President's powers likewise failed to appre-
ciate the full depth of the Sutherland opinion with which they
sought to bolster their position. Arkes addresses the failings on
both sides by way of a puzzle, but it is not the puzzle he de-
scribes explicitly-that both sides in the Iran-Contra battle
looked to Sutherland's opinions to support their respective posi-
tions (p 35). Rather, considering the organizational structure of
the book, we think the puzzle he means to suggest is a more
oblique one. The discussion of the Iran-Contra affair occurs, odd-
ly, not where it would seem most appropriate, in Chapter 7,
which deals with the President's powers over foreign policy, but
in the book's introductory chapter and again in its very last pag-
es. Arkes's notable omission of the subject from Chapter 7 thus
leads us to recharacterize his puzzle as follows: If the President
does indeed have such powers over foreign policy as George
Sutherland described in Curtiss-Wright, and as Arkes himself
summarizes in Chapter 7, why was President Reagan not able to
defend his policy supporting the Nicaraguan Contras? Or, per-
haps more to the point, why was a special prosecutor able to
return indictments against individuals whose actions must be
said to be perfectly within the authority of the President?
A short answer might be that the President's legal advisors
were among those conservatives, criticized by Arkes, who had
adopted the legal positivism of Justice Hugo Black and who thus
themselves doubted the proposition that the President had any
authority that could not be circumscribed by an act of Congress.
But that answer is too facile, for certainly some of the President's
advisors must have argued that the President did have such
powers.' 4 Indeed, it seems that even Congress itself was unwill-
ing to press the issue, since the Boland Amendment, which
banned aid to the Contras, was admittedly "framed with a cer-
tain reserve about confining the president, precisely because
there was a serious constitutional question about the authority of
the Congress to bind the Executive" (p 34).
's Olson, 487 US at 705-06 (Scalia dissenting).
' Compare L. Gordon Crovitz, Crime, the Constitution, and the Iran-Contra Affair,
Commentary 23, 28 (Oct 1987) (arguing that Reagan's Iran-Contra policy was a proper
exercise of the executive power, was authorized by historical and judicial precedents, and
was not prohibited by the Boland amendment or its legislative history).
1996] 1351
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Yet, if the power of the President was so clear, why did the
Iran-Contra Affair become the Iran-Contra "Scandal"? Why the
indictments? We think Arkes provides an answer in his discus-
sion of Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright.
The President's power over the "vast external realm" of for-
eign affairs did not, according to Sutherland, owe its existence to
any act of Congress, but to "the very delicate, plenary and exclu-
sive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations-a power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." 5
For Sutherland, this power was inherent in the very notion of
sovereignty. Arkes argues that by defining the source of the
President's power in this way, "Sutherland helped license a pow-
er for the president that was unconstrained by the Constitution"
(p 33).16 We need not acquiesce in Arkes's suggestion that the
President's powers in the field of foreign affairs are "beyond the
Constitution" (p 239),"7  however, to recognize that the
Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 319-20.
16 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argues in Olson that the President's powers are
expressly granted. The contrast between Article II, which provides that "[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States," and Article I, which merely
provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States," demonstrates, Scalia argues, that the President was granted all executive
powers. Olson, 487 US at 697-98, 705 (Scalia dissenting).
17 Sutherland wrote, for example, that the President's powers, "like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution." Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 320. The inference Arkes draws from Suther-
land's position is certainly correct, however; there are no "applicable provisions of the
Constitution" that can circumscribe the President's power over foreign affairs if, as
Sutherland stated, that power is inherent in the very idea of sovereignty. We disagree not
with the implication Arkes draws from Sutherland's statement, but with the statement
itself. Sutherland, it seems, misunderstood the idea of sovereignty, at least as the Ameri-
can Founders understood it. Sovereignty resides, originally and always, in the people, not
in any organ or officer of government. Sutherland, however, apparently viewed sovereign-
ty as if it were a king's prerogative, a prerogative that passed, in the case of the United
States, from the King of England to the Continental Congress in 1776, and from that body
to the President in 1787. The following passage from Sutherland's opinion is telling:
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Con-
stitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by
the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government,
leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states .... That this doc-
trine applies only to powers which the states had, is self-evident. And since the
states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have
been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source.
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President's powers in such matters are at least not dependent on
Congress and, therefore, not capable of limitation by an act of
Congress.' Instead, Arkes argues that the check on the
President's power is not a legal one, but a moral one. It is a pow-
er, according to Arkes, that is necessarily confined by its "reason-
ableness" (p 289).
Once the full import of this logic is understood, the Iran-
Contra puzzle resolves itself. As long as the President was able
to make a case that supplying the Contras was necessary for the
ultimate defense of the United States, Congress was essentially
Id at 315-16 (citation omitted). Sutherland's premise is not only not self-evident but high-
ly questionable. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 208-09 (Foundation 12th ed
1991) ("Justice Sutherland's Curtiss-Wright dictum is questionable historically.. . ."). The
source of the Constitution's authority is not the states, but 'We the People of the United
States." It is the national people, as a sovereign people distinct from the people in each of
the several states, that delegated some of their sovereign powers to a national govern-
ment. See, for example, Speech of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec
4, 1787), reprinted in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 1 The Founders' Constitution
61, 62 (Chicago 1987); John C. Eastman, Open to Merit of Every Description?, 73 Denver
U L Rev 89, 109 (1995). The legislative powers that the national people granted to the
national government, including such international powers as the power to declare war
and to grant letters of marque and reprisal, US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 11, are expressly
limited to the powers enumerated in the Constitution itself. See US Const, Art I, § 1 ("All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. .. .")
(emphasis added). To be sure, the grant of executive power is not so limited. See US
Const, Art II, § 1, cl 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."). See also Olson, 487 US at 699, 705 (Scalia dissenting). But see
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson concurring) ("I
cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive pow-
er but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter
stated."). The fact that the power is granted through a constitution, however, necessarily
implies that it is also limited by other provisions in that document. Arkes no doubt recog-
nizes this fact, as his reference to Abraham Lincoln's defense of his action suspending the
writ of habeas corpus suggests (p 288), citing President Abraham Lincoln, Message to
Congress, Senate Exec Doc No 1, 37th Cong, 1st Sess 9 (July 5, 1861) ("[A]re all the laws
but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violat-
ed?"). Lincoln, however, or at least his lawyers, later claimed that the suspension of the
writ was within his executive powers. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F Cases 144, 148 (C C
D Md 1861) (No 9,487) (describing the government's argument that the suspension of the
writ was within the executive powers of the President); Exparte Milligan, 71 US (4 Wall)
2, 125 (1866) (same).
"8 Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown, distinguished among: (1) actions that
the President takes pursuant to a grant of authority from Congress, in which circum-
stance the President's "authority is at its maximum"; (2) actions taken where the grant of
authority from Congress is ambiguous, and presidential authority is therefore in "a zone
of twilight"; and (3) actions taken that are "incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress," in which case the President's power "is at its lowest ebb." 343 US at
635-37. Notably, Jackson does not argue that the President is without power in the last
circumstance, only that his power, if it exists, must be based solely on authority that is
delegated in the Constitution itself, and that is not inconsistent with an authority delegat-
ed to Congress. Id at 637.
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powerless to insist on compliance with the Boland Amendment.
But when the policy became tied to the negotiations over the
release of the Iranian hostages, which is to say when the policy
became indefensible in the court of public opinion, Congress was
shed of its powerlessness and was able to hold hearings, with
individual members railing about the President's "violation" of
the law. Interestingly, however, none of the people indicted by
the special prosecutor were convicted on the counts charging
conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment, 9 and some were
not even charged with Boland Amendment violations." Rather,
the special prosecutor was only able to obtain convictions on
derivative charges such as perjury and obstruction of justice2'
(most of which were overturned on appeal22), providing further
proof that the President's policy was not illegal as a matter of
"9 The special prosecutor used the general conspiracy statute, 18 USC § 371 (1988), to
reach the alleged Boland Amendment violations. Specifically, he charged John M.
Poindexter, Oliver L. North, Richard V. Secord, and Albert Hakim with conspiring "to
defraud the United States... by depriving the Government of the United States of the
honest and faithful services of employees free from conflicts of interest, corruption and self
dealing." See Indictment § 13(a)(2), United States v Poindexter, Crim No Cr 88-0080-02 (D
DC Mar 16, 1988), quoted in Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights:
The Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 Am Crim L Rev 181, 194 n 60 (1988). See
also Ronald K. Noble, The Independent Counsel Versus the Attorney General in a
Classified Information Procedures Act-Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33 BC L Rev
539, 556 n 79 (1992) (summarizing indictment); Andrew W. Hayes, The Boland Amend-
ments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 Colum L Rev 1534, 1534 (1988) ("[Count 1 of] the
indictment in United States v Poindexter alleges a conspiracy to violate the Amend-
ments.").
2 See, for example, Noble, 33 BC L Rev at 561 (cited in note 19) ("Joseph F.
Fernandez, a former CIA station chief,... was charged with two counts of obstructing
proceedings of Congress [18 USC § 1505 (1988)] and two counts of giving false statements
[18 USC § 1001 (1988)]."). See also United States v Fernandez, 887 F2d 465, 467 (4th Cir
1989).
" Robert McFarlane, for example, pled guilty to four misdemeanor charges of with-
holding information from Congress. See Marc R. Salans, Independent Counsel, 56 Geo
Wash L Rev 900, 901 n 4 (1988), citing Joe Pichirallo, McFarlane Enters Guilty Plea
Arising From Iran-Contra Affair, Wash Post Al, Al (Mar 12, 1988). See also James N.
Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to Escape
Accountability, 27 U Richmond L Rev 345, 364 (1993).
n Oliver North, for example, was convicted on three of the twelve counts brought
against him: obstructing Congress under 18 USC §§ 2, 1505 (1988), destruction of docu-
ments under 18 USC § 2071(b) (1988), and accepting an illegal gratuity under 18 USC §
201(c)(1)(B) (1988). United States v North, 910 F2d 843, 851-52 (DC Cir 1990). The convic-
tions on all three counts were vacated, id at 852, and the case was later dismissed.
Haynes Johnson and Tracy Thompson, North Charges Dismissed At Request of Prosecutor,
Wash Post Al, Al (Sept 17, 1991). Similarly, John Poindexter's convictions for perjury
and obstructing Congress were reversed on appeal. United States v Poindexter, 951 F2d
369, 388 (DC Cir 1991).
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law, but rather became indefensible in the court of public opin-
ion.
II. LIBERALS V CONSERVATIVES
The puzzle over Iran-Contra parallels a more significant
puzzle brought to light by Arkes's restoration of George
Sutherland's jurisprudence. Both liberals and conservatives draw
on Sutherland's precedents, Arkes argues, yet both reject the
principles underlying those precedents. Leading conservative ju-
rists, such as Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Judge Robert
Bork, have rejected Sutherland's natural rights philosophy in fa-
vor of Justice Hugo Black's legal positivism. According to Arkes:
[I]n their recoil from substantive due process, conservatives
have followed the line of Hugo Black, Franklin Roosevelt's
first appointee to the Supreme Court. For Black, the vice of
substantive due process was connected, inescapably, to the
vice of taking natural rights seriously (p 27).
Arkes repeats this criticism throughout the book. He describes
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, as Justice Black's "disciple"
(p 28),2' and Judge Bork comes under heavy criticism for his
rejection of the principles underlying Justice Rufus Peckham's
opinion in Lochner v New York24---principles grounded, like
Sutherland's, in natural rights (p 27). Bork, recounts Arkes, de-
scribed Peckham's opinion in Lochner as "an opinion whose name
lives in the law as the symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judi-
cial usurpation of power .... To this day, when a judge simply
makes up the Constitution he is said 'to Lochnerize,' usually by
someone who does not like the result."
2
' See, for example, William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
Tex L Rev 693, 705 (1976) (arguing that proponents of the conception of a "living constitu-
tion" misunderstand the role of the legislature in updating laws, forget past disasters
caused by judicial activism, and ignore the stability of the democratic process). For a more
comprehensive treatment of the argument that some conservatives such as Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Judge Bork have adopted legal positivism, see Harry V. Jaffa, et al,
Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed Question (Regnery 1994);
Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of
the United States?, 10 U Puget Sound L Rev 351 (1987); Harry V. Jaffa, Storm Over the
Constitution: Jaffa Answers Bork 28-35 (Claremont Institute 1994).
24 198 US 45 (1905).
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 44 (Free Press 1990). Arkes might have
referred as well to Judge Bark's ill fated confirmation hearing, in which he compared the
Ninth Amendment to an "ink blot" on the Constitution. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork
to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings before the
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Liberals, on the other hand, have adopted the "logic" of natu-
ral rights, while rejecting the very basis of that logic. The corner-
stones of liberal jurisprudence-the rights to "privacy" and to
"autonomy," and, most notably, the "right to an abortion"-are
grounded in substantive due process, which is to say, in the logic
of natural rights that was central to the jurisprudence of George
Sutherland, and Justice Peckham before him. The irony of this
fact did not escape Justice Black, who, by the fortunes of history,
was still on the Court when "this migration of philosophic pre-
mises" began to take root (p 28). His dissent in Griswold v Con-
necticut,26 which Arkes describes as "bitter," sounded a yet
largely unheralded alarm for liberals about the dangers of
grounding their new philosophy in the already rejected logic of
their adversaries (id).
Arkes's claim that contemporary liberal jurisprudence is
grounded in the 'logic of natural rights" at first appears inconsis-
tent with a passage in the book's preface, where he states that
"Both conservatives and liberals.., have moved away from natu-
ral rights and embraced one version or another of 'legal
positivism!" (p x) (emphasis added). Arkes draws a clear distinc-
tion, however, between his claim that contemporary liberal juris-
prudence is grounded in the logic of natural rights and the idea
that it is grounded in natural rights itself, and he never asserts
the latter. The "logic" of natural rights described by Arkes is a
logic that rejects the legal positivist's view that "law" is simply
the command of the sovereign, even a sovereign majority (p 25),
and that "logic" is certainly the hallmark of contemporary liberal
jurisprudence. Liberal jurists, according to Arkes:
[H]ave not shown the slightest hesitation in sweeping aside
policies, crafted by local governments and passed by elected
officials, that offer abridgements of [the] new rights [of "pri-
vacy" and of "autonomy"]. In other words, they have been
willing to make a rather expansive, frequent appeal to the
logic of natural rights in overturning the laws made by ma-
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 249 (1989) ("I do
not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know something of what it means.
For example, if you had an amendment that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there
is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do
not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it.").
See also Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 12 Const Comm 93, 94 n 5 (1995).
26 381 US 479 (1965).
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jorities and vindicating the interests of privacy and autono-
my (p 28).
But, again, Arkes leaves no doubt that the liberals' appeal to
the logic of natural rights is not an appeal to natural rights it-
self. He speaks, for example, of a "paradox" at the heart of the
international movement for women's rights in terms that are
unmistakable:
Even in our own day many writers in the vanguard of
"women's rights" are quite explicitly hostile to the under-
standing of "natural rights." They profess to doubt that there
is any such "nature" of human beings that remains every-
where the same, and they especially recoil from the under-
standing of the Founders that "natural rights" were bound
up with certain "self-evident" moral "truths." On the other
hand, they think they can identify the oppression of women
in a variety of exotic settings all over the world. That is to
say, they can recognize moral wrongs even in cultures that
are not their own. They think themselves warranted then in
casting judgments and proclaiming the "rights" of women
even in distant places. And so, the paradox we find in our
own time may be put in this way: In the understanding of
the most advanced feminism, there are "human rights" to be
vindicated in all places, but in the strictest sense there are
no humans; and since there are no moral truths, there are
no rights that are "truly rightful" (p 9).
Both liberals and conservatives, then, rely on Sutherland's
opinions without grasping the principles that support them. "The
consequence," according to Arkes, "is that conservatives and
liberals have both produced a jurisprudence for which they can-
not give a coherent moral account. The irony is that Sutherland
could supply the moral ground that is missing in the jurispru-
dence of each" (p x). Precisely how Sutherland's natural rights
jurisprudence does that is the subject of the remainder of the
book. We take up a few of his examples.
III. LIBERALS AND THE LIBERTY TO CONTRACT
The "liberty to contract," as articulated in the opinions of
Justices Sutherland and Peckham, is viewed by many historians
and constitutional commentators as "the badge of a reactionary"
(p 276). Yet the same idea has been revived by contemporary
liberals to further the ends of the civil rights movement, and in
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their hands it is viewed as a sign of progressive thinking. The
Civil Rights Act of 1866,2" which recognized for blacks "the same
right... to make and enforce contracts... [and] to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal proper-
ty... as is enjoyed by white citizens,"28 has thus been used to
prohibit discrimination in, for example, private housing 9 and
private schools. 0 Prompted by this observation, Arkes gives to
us a splendid problem: "A fine question has been raised," he
writes, "as to whether the drafters of the statute in 1866 had
ever intended, as part of the 'right to contract,' the right to con-
tract with a party who was unwilling to sell his products or ser-
vices" (p 277).
The question, as posed by Arkes, seems at first to answer
itself; one claiming the right to enter into an agreement with
another through mutual consent cannot possibly also have the
right to force an agreement on an unwilling party without de-
stroying the right to contract itself. Yet for Arkes, the answer to
the "fine" question is not so self-evident, for he notes that there is
an "equally fine" response:
[T]he law is directed to parties who have already indicated
their willingness to sell or to enter transactions with the
general public. Those parties are now presuming to narrow
or withdraw that willingness to be open for transactions
with the public. They would close themselves off to transac-
tions with black people and treat them, in effect, as parties
unfit for their business (p 277).
Arkes does not solve the problem, but rather leaves the issue,
"however we come to resolve that question," for us (p 277).
Despite the fact that he uses the same adjective, "fine," to
describe both the question and its response, we are not left with
the sense that Arkes himself thinks the matter unresolvable, or
in the equipoise that he first suggests. The adjective "fine" cus-
tomarily conveys a sense of praiseworthiness in its object or de-
scribes an intellectually subtle and refined reasoning, but it can
also be used ironically, even derogatorily, as raising a distinction
that is too clever or cunning.3 Which definition applies to the
' 14 Stat 27, reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat 140, 144,
codified at 42 USC §§ 1981-82 (1994).
Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat at 27.
Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US 409 (1968).
Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160 (1976).
See 4 Oxford English Dictionary 227-28 (Oxford 1961).
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question, and which to the response, Arkes does not say, al-
though he does not leave us entirely without a clue as to his
thinking.
In the paragraph immediately following the presentation of
the "fine" question and "equally fine" response, Arkes uses the
adjective again, but this time leaves no doubt as to its meaning.
"It may raise [ I] a fine metaphysical question," he notes, "[wihy
[ ] the 'freedom of contract'... marks an expansion of rights and
the defense of human dignity" when used as the "banner of liber-
al emancipation," but the "'liberty to contract' mark[s] a crimped
spirit of cranky, ungenerous judges" when used by Sutherland
and Peckham (p 277). "There is," he writes, "no distinction of con-
sequence" (id) between the two phrases. In so writing, Arkes
demonstrates that, here at least, he means to use the adjective
ironically, to show that the liberal jurists who would make such a
distinction are being disingenuously clever.
Of course, as between the "fine" question and the "fine" re-
sponse, the one associated with liberal jurisprudence is the latter,
but to impart the same irony to that earlier use of the adjective
would be too simple a solution. Indeed, Arkes's use of the phrase
"equally fine response" suggests that there is more to this prob-
lem than would first appear.
The "equally fine" response to the objection that the right to
contract cannot include the right to force a contract on an unwill-
ing party is, according to Arkes, that the law obligates parties
who have "already indicated their willingness to sell or to enter
transactions with the general public" (p 277). Arkes thus sug-
gests that such parties have undertaken an implied contractual
obligation to serve the general public, an obligation that has long
been recognized by the common law. William Blackstone, for
example, wrote that businesses that held themselves out as serv-
ing the public had a common law obligation to serve all custom-
ers under an implied contract theory.3 2
" William M. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *166 (citation omitted):
[If an innkeeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for trav-
ellers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way; and
upon this universal assumpsit an action will lie against him for damages, if he
without good reason refuses to admit a traveller.
See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241, 284 (1964) (Douglas concur-
ring) ("[The English common law] reasoned that one who employed his private property
for purposes of commercial gain by offering goods or services to the public must stick to
his bargain."); Lane v Cotton, 88 Eng Rep 855 (QB 1701) (Blacksmith obliged to serve all
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The implied contract rationale does not provide an adequate
foundation for the recent use made of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, however. As the history of the civil rights movement in this
country demonstrates, the problem was not just that states were
not enforcing the common law's implied contract to serve all
customers, but that owners of theaters and lunch counters were
making it vividly clear that they had replaced any implied con-
tract to serve all members of the public with an express contract
to serve only some. A "Whites Only" sign on the front of a drug
store left no doubt about the unwillingness of the store owner to
entertain certain customers. Or, to take an example outside of
the highly charged racial context, a sign on the front door of an
apartment building that reads, "Unit Available, Senior Citizens
Only," negates any implied contract to rent to the general public.
That is not the end of the matter, of course, for there was
more to the common law duty to serve the general public than
the existence of an implied contract. For example, the common
law also treated an innkeeper's refusal, without sufficient reason,
to accept a traveler as a public nuisance, thus subjecting the
innkeeper to indictment and fine under the state's police pow-
er.3 A state's refusal to enforce such obligations amounted to a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, and thus was clearly
within the power of Congress to address under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. However, Congress sought to prohibit dis-
customers.). Although Blackstone wrote more than a century before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, his views on the common law were still treated as authoritative
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In an edition of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries published just after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example,
Thomas Cooley (with whom Sutherland studied (pp 41-42)), described Blackstone's work
as "the best book in which to take a comprehensive view of the rudiments of English and
American law.. . ." Thomas Cooley, ed, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land v (Callaghan 2d ed 1876).
3 As Blackstone put it:
Inns, in particular, being intended for the lodging and receipt of travellers, may be
indicted, suppressed, and the innkeepers fined, if they refuse to entertain a traveller
without a very sufficient cause: for thus to frustrate the end of their institution is
held to be disorderly behaviour.
William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *168. Theaters and other places of public enter-
tainment covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 18 Stat 335, 336, also implicated
state action in a way that is often lost on the late-twentieth-century audience. Dating to
classical times, theaters were often constructed as public works projects and were state
owned. See, for example, The Institutes of Justinian, Book II, Title 1, § 6 (Oxford 5th ed
1913) (J.B. Moyle, trans) (mentioning theaters and racecourses as examples of things that
"belong to cities in their corporate capacity").
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crimination by innkeepers, common carriers, and other suppliers
of public accommodation with the Civil Rights Act of 1875,"4 not
with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. A review of the 1875 Act and
its invalidation by the Supreme Court will therefore help bring
our present problem into sharper focus.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided that "all persons with-
in the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement."35 The
law was "applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, re-
gardless of any previous condition of servitude."36 In the Civil
Rights Cases, the Supreme Court struck down the Act, correctly
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state ac-
tion.3" In so doing, however, the Court failed to recognize the
extent to which state action was implicated when common carri-
ers and places of public accommodation refused to serve all com-
ers." When a state's law-common or statutory-required that
certain kinds of businesses be open to the public, the state's re-
fusal to enforce such laws on behalf of blacks, for example, de-
nied blacks the equal protection of the laws in the truest sense of
the phrase.
This is not to say that the judgment in the Civil Rights Cas-
es striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was erroneous.
Through that Act, Congress did not provide a remedy against
state governments for their failure to provide to their citizens the
equal protection of the laws.39 Rather, Congress sought to exer-
cise a police power of its own, directly regulating private behavior
" Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 18 Stat 335, 336.
5 Id, 18 Stat at 336.
36 Id.
37 109 US 3, 24-25 (1883).
' See, for example, McCabe v Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Co., in which
the Court stated:
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if he is
denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law,
a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under substantially the
same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that
his constitutional privilege has been invaded.
235 US 151, 161-62 (1914).
' Compare Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803) (recognizing that, "in Great Britain, the king himself is sued" for the
failure to provide to his citizens the protection of the laws).
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without the nexus to state action that would have brought the
Act within the scope of the authority granted to Congress by § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4" Thus, the problem with the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not that Congress sought to prohibit
discrimination by common carriers and places of public accommo-
dation, but that the means Congress chose to reach that end
were beyond its constitutional authority.
When Congress sought to prohibit discrimination by common
carriers and places of public accommodation nearly a century
later by enacting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
flawed reasoning in the Civil Rights Cases compelled it to rely on
the Commerce Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment as
the source of its authority to do so.4 Title II thus required a
nexus with interstate commerce that distorted Congress's author-
ity under the Commerce Clause,42 and, more significantly, ob-
scured what it is about common carriers and places of public
accommodation that properly allows government to determine
with whom such businesses must enter into contracts.
It was in the midst of this confusion in public accommodation
law that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was revived and used to
force contracts upon unwilling private parties outside of the pub-
lic accommodation and common carrier framework.4 The fiction
" See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Dis-
crimination Laws 130 (Harvard 1992) ("[B]oth [the Thirteenth and Fourteenth]
[A]mendments are problematic sources of federal power to enact a general
antidiscrimination law applicable to the actions of private parties.").
41 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 US at 284 (Douglas concurring) ("The Senate
Committee laid emphasis on the Commerce Clause [as authority for Title II]... to
surmount what was thought to be the obstacle of the Civil Rights Cases.... ."). Justice
Douglas argued in Heart of Atlanta Motel that the proper authority for Title II was
nevertheless § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause, though he did
not expressly call for overturning of the Civil Rights Cases. See id at 280 ("I would prefer
to rest on the assertion of legislative power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... ."). See also Gunther, Constitutional Law at 148-49 (cited in note 17) (arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Commerce Clause is the proper source of
congressional power to enact Title II); Epstein, Forbidden Grounds at 140 (cited in note
40) ("There is no question... that [Title II] falls outside [the commerce] power as it was
originally written and understood.").
42 It was, after all, not the effect on commerce that was Congress's concern, but the
moral wrong of discrimination, as the House Judiciary Committee Report made clear:
"[Title II] would make it possible to remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in
discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public." Civil
Rights Act of 1963, HR Rep No 914, 88th Cong, 2d Sess 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964
USCCAN 2391, 2393-94. See also Daniel v Paul, 395 US 298, 307-08 (1969); Heart of
Atlanta Motel 379 US at 291 (Goldberg concurring) ("The primary purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964... is the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics."), cit-
ing Civil Rights-Public Accommodations, S Rep No 872, 88th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1964).
"' See, for example, Jones, 392 US at 439 (holding that § 1982 prohibits all racial dis-
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that Congress had power to enact Title II under the Commerce
Clause was as easily extended to private carriers and private
housing as it was to purely intrastate common carriers and plac-
es of public accommodation," and the moral aversion to discrim-
ination was as strong in the one class of cases as in the other.
The legal distinction between the two classes of cases-that the
state itself was implicated when it refused to enforce the obliga-
tions imposed on common carriers and places of public accommo-
dation-was, however, lost, and with it the ability to avoid the
contradiction inherent in the current "liberty to contract" juris-
prudence was lost as well.
With this background, it is now possible to see how Arkes
could simultaneously describe the objection to current "liberty to
contract" jurisprudence as "fine" and the response as "equally
fine." Both positions could be correct, depending on the nature of
the contract involved. Common carriers or places of public accom-
modation could be "forced" to enter into contracts because that
was part of their bargain, or because to do otherwise was deemed
a public nuisance. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides a mecha-
nism by which such a claim is raised because of the historical
anomaly that Title II was necessarily limited to businesses en-
gaged in interstate commerce (or those that affected such com-
merce). Others, however, could not be forced to enter into such
contracts without violating the principled grounds of the right to
contract itself. Arkes leaves unanswered whether there is any
limit to the expansion of what constitutes a "common carrier" or
a "public accommodation," but once we understand the principled
origin of that obligation, we can more readily assess the propriety
of its extension.45 Though that inquiry would give a moral coher-
crimination in property sales, public or private); Runyon, 427 US at 178-79 (holding that §
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in school admissions regardless whether school is
public or private).
" See, for example, Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294 (1964), in which the Su-
preme Court upheld on Commerce Clause grounds the application of Title II to Ollie's
Barbecue, a small restaurant that served primarily local customers, that was not situated
along an interstate transportation route, and that purchased its supplies from local
suppliers (although a portion of the supplies so purchased did originate out-of-state). See
also Epstein, Forbidden Grounds at 140 (cited in note 40) ("Any court that is ingenious
enough to find that Ollie's Barbecue operates within interstate commerce is ingenious
enough to find that every restaurant in the land does so as well.").
' Justice Sutherland, for his part, was unwilling to extend common carrier obliga-
tions to private carriers merely because the latter used the public highways in the course
of their business, see Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v Railroad Commission, 271 US 583, 599
(1926), but had no difficulty with a state statute that treated a cotton gin as a public
utility, see Frost v Corporation Commission, 278 US 515, 519-21 (1929).
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ence to the liberal jurisprudence on the subject, it would not
necessarily support the ends furthered by that jurisprudence,
since the principle on which the obligation of common carriers
and places of public accommodation is based does not support an
extension of that obligation to individuals or to the full range of
private businesses that liberal jurists have sought to bring under
the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
IV. CONSERVATIVES AND TEE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Defenders of the New Deal will find in a cursory reading of
Arkes's chapter on "The Puzzle of the Commerce Clause" a de-
fense of the claim that the Commerce Clause confers on Congress
a national police power, but the chapter is in truth a challenge to
conservative jurists who, according to Arkes, have abandoned the
tools necessary to oppose such a claim.
The power to regulate commerce, Arkes writes, is the power
"to describe the conditions under which commerce may 'lawfully'
be conducted" (p 131). But that determination requires that the
law mark off the boundaries between "the legitimate and the
illegitimate, the right and the wrong," which Arkes recognizes
"were part of the traditional police powers of the state and local
governments" (p 132). He suggests that because individual states
were not competent to the task in a national economy, the na-
tional government had to be given such powers (id). A few pages
later, Arkes describes the full import of this proposition: "The
power of Congress may finally extend to the most local operations
of the most local of businesses, to the matters that were thought
to lie most clearly within the jurisdiction of the states and local
government" (p 137). This is so, apparently, because "the authori-
ty of Congress over commerce really dr[aws] on the same ancient
moral sources as the police powers in the states" (id).
Arkes is too thorough an originalist scholar to subscribe to
such an anachronistic reading of the Commerce Clause, howev-
er.46 Indeed, although he recognizes that "[t]hrough the Com-
46 See, for example, Federalist 45 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist
Papers 288, 292-93 (Mentor 1961) ("The powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State."). Even Chief Justice Marshall drew a distinction between the regulation of com-
merce and the police power, the latter being part of the "acknowledged power of a state,"
and "not surrendered to the general government." Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1,
203, 205 (1824). See also US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 2 (recognizing, as an exception to the
ban on state imposition of duties on imports and exports, the states' exercise of their
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merce Clause we back into [such an] understanding, or find it
inescapable," he states that "it cannot be through the Commerce
Clause that we may explain this power of Congress to reach
anywhere, in the territory of the United States, that the law may
justly reach in legislating on rights and wrongs" (p 137). How
exactly the Commerce Clause came to take on a police power
dimension, Arkes does not say. By quoting Justice McKenna's
opinion in Hoke v United States,4" Arkes suggests that it is the
General Welfare Clause rather than the Commerce Clause that
conveys such a power to the national government, but he had
earlier demonstrated that the General Welfare Clause was a
restriction on, rather than a grant of, congressional power (pp
112-14). Herein lies the puzzle to which Arkes refers in the
chapter's title. Let us try to solve it, first by reconstructing how it
is that we "backed" into a police power understanding of the
Commerce Clause, and then by assessing whether conservative
jurisprudence can offer any coherent check on that power.
Conflict over commerce was one of the primary motivating
factors for the Federal Convention of 1787 and, indeed, was the
principal subject of discussion at the Annapolis Convention of
1786. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states retained the
power to tax imports. They taxed goods imported from other
states,49 a practice that not only impeded commerce between the
states but threatened to produce "animosity and discord" between
them as well.5" Port states were also imposing duties on goods
police powers through inspection laws).
47 227 US 308, 322 (1913) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910, 36 Stat
825, which outlawed the transportation of women in interstate commerce for prostitution
or other immoral purposes).
4' See also United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 65 (1936).
4' See, for example, Letter from Tench Coxe to the Virginia Commissioners at Annap-
olis, in 9 The Papers of James Madison 124-26 (Chicago 1975), reprinted in Philip B.
Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 3 The Founders' Constitution 473-74 (Chicago 1987) ('That
Goods of the growth product and manufacture of the Other States in Union were charged
with high Duties upon importation into the enacting State-as great in many instances as
those imposed on foreign Articles of the same Kinds.").
' Federalist 22 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 144-45 (cited in
note 46):
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true
spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not re-
strained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not
less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the in-
tercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.
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from foreign nations, a practice that allowed them effectively to
tax the citizens of neighboring states to whom those goods were
destined.5' Contrary to the view held by the modern Supreme
Court and many scholars, these problems were addressed in the
Constitution not by the Commerce Clause, but by the provision in
Article I, § 10 that prohibits the states from imposing duties on
imports and exports.52
The levying of taxes was not the only way in which the
states impeded interstate commerce, however. Through the exer-
cise of its police powers, a state might ban the possession of cer-
tain goods-liquor, for instance-within its borders;53 however,
the commerce between states that have not banned the goods
might have to move through the intermediary state. Because the
ban applies equally to liquor produced out of state and that pro-
duced in state, the ban would not run afoul of the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause.54 Nevertheless, Congress,
acting pursuant to its power to "regulate Commerce ... among
the several States,"55 could require that the shipment be permit-
ted lest the intermediary state's ban prevent commerce between
the other states. 6 As Justice Bushrod Washington, writing as
The reference to "duties" that German princes imposed on each others' goods, in the sen-
tence immediately following, suggests that Hamilton likewise meant "duties" when he
spoke of "interfering and unneighborly regulations." See id at 145.
"' See Federalist 42 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 264, 267
(cited in note 46) ("A very material object of [the power to regulate commerce among the
states] was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from
the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.").
12 See, for example, Brown v Maryland, 25 US (12 Wheat) 419 (1827) (invalidating
tax on goods imported from other states while still in their original package). But see The
License Cases, 46 US (5 How) 504, 595 (1847) (McLean) (arguing that the Article I, § 10
ban against states laying duties on imports applied only to goods imported from abroad,
not from other states); Woodruff v Parham, 75 US (8 Wall) 123 (1869) (upholding state
tax on goods sold at auction, including goods that had moved via interstate commerce,
because they were not "imports" for purposes of the Article I, § 10 ban). Madison's state-
ment in Federalist 42 does suggest that it was the Commerce Clause, not the § 10 ban on
duties, that provided relief against the latter problem.
' See Willson v Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 US (2 Pet) 245 (1829), which Joseph
Story described "as holding that the state's authority to act under 'other powers, beside
that of regulating commerce,' was not destroyed by the commerce clause." David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1888 176 n 126 (Chicago 1985),
quoting Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1069 at
517 (Hilliard, Gray 1833). We are greatly indebted to Professor Currie's annotated trea-
tise for calling our attention to these and many of the more obscure case citations which
follow.
' See, for example, Ward v Maryland, 79 US (12 Wall) 418, 430-32 (1871); Paul v
Virginia, 75 US (8 Wall) 168, 180 (1869); Connor v Elliott, 59 US (18 How) 591, 594
(1856).
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
Indeed, under the Court's current jurisprudence, the dormant Commerce Clause
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circuit justice in Corfield v Coryell, stated, "[c]om-
merce... among the several states . . .must include all the
means by which it can be carried on, [including]... passage over
land through the states, where such passage becomes necessary
to the commercial intercourse between the states."57 "It is this
intercourse," wrote Washington, "which congress is invested with
the power of regulating, and with which no state has a right to
interfere."58 The Court's attempt to distinguish between goods
that merely travelled through a state, the commerce in which
was thus protected by the Commerce Clause, and goods that had
come to rest within a state and thus became subject to the state's
police powers, gave rise to what became known as the "original
container" or "broken package" doctrine.59
The distinction between goods moving through a state and
goods coming to rest within the state proved insufficient to ad-
dress all the ways in which a state might deliberately restrain
interstate commerce, however. The use of the police power to
close in-state markets, for example, can have a substantial effect
on commerce even if transportation through the state can be
required. The question that then arose was whether Congress
could require the state not just to allow liquor to be transported
through it to a final destination outside it, but also to rescind its
own ban.
Justice Washington begged the question in Corfield: "[The
commerce power] does by no means impair the right of the state
government to legislate upon all subjects of internal police within
their territorial limits,... even although such legislation may
indirectly and remotely affect commerce, provided it do not inter-
fere with the regulations of congress upon the same subject.""0 In
the License Cases, however, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on
retail sales of liquor imported from other states, even though the
may require the states to permit passage even absent congressional legislation on the
subject. See, for example, Oklahoma Tax Commission v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S Ct
1331, 1335 (1995) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from
placing burdens on the flow of commerce across their borders, "even when Congress has
failed to legislate on the subject").
', 6 F Cases 546, 550 (C C E D Pa 1823) (No 3,230).
5 Id.
" See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v Bondurant, 257 US 282, 290 (1921) (Commerce
"embraces as well the sale of goods after they reach their destination and while they are
in the original packages."); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v White, 296 US 176, 184
(1935) ("The operation of the order is intrastate, beginning after... the original package
has been broken."). Compare Brown, 25 US (12 Wheat) at 441-42 (striking down a state
tax on imported goods in their original packages).
'0 6 F Cases at 550 (emphasis added).
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effect on commerce was great.6 Similarly, in Kidd v Pearson,
the Court upheld a ban on the manufacture of liquor, even
though much of the liquor so banned was destined for interstate com-
merce.62 Justice Sutherland drew on the latter case in his opin-
ion for the Court in Carter v Carter Coal Co., in which he stated:
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power
and of the police power, and the delimitation between them,
however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized
and observed, for while the one furnishes the strongest bond
of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the
autonomy of the states as required by our dual form of gov-
ernment ... 63
That the states retained the power to enact police regulations,
even when such affected commerce, seems unobjectionable. The
Constitution itself recognizes that the national interest in com-
merce had to give way, when "absolutely necessary," to the legiti-
mate exercise of police powers in the states."
Suppose that the purpose of a state's ban was not a police
power purpose-that is, to protect the health, safety, or morals of
the people-but was instead to restrict trade from another region
of the country. Suppose, for example, that the states of New
England banned the use and retail sale of cotton in order to ben-
efit their own wool producers, who compete with southern cotton
producers in the sale of material to New England clothing manu-
facturers. Since the ban technically prohibits the sale of all cot-
ton-that made in the New England states as well as that made
in the South-it would not run afoul of the Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause.65 Yet, because the New England states
do not produce cotton, this restriction on trade seems to be one of
the very ills that the Framers sought to prevent. Justice
61 46 US (5 How) 504, 586, 596-97, 610-11, 617, 630-31, 632 (1847).
62 128 US 1, 20-23 (1888).
298 US 238, 301 (1936), quoting United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 US 1, 13
(1895).
" See US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Con-
gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it's inspection Laws ... .") (emphasis added). See also Gibbons, 22
US (9 Wheat) at 205 (acknowledging that states could affect commerce using their police
powers, such as through quarantine or inspection laws).
But see Woodruff, 75 US (8 Wall) at 145-46 (Nelson dissenting) (arguing that a
New York tax on "all sales of cotton, tobacco, or rice... would be a tax without any
discrimination; and yet it would be in fact, in its operation and effect, exclusively upon
these Southern products").
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Washington's statement in Corfield-that "no state has a right to
interfere" with such commerce-suggests that, even absent an act
of Congress, such a regulation would be contrary to the Com-
merce Clause.66
Yet a great difficulty arises if the New England states make
a colorable argument that the ban really was a police regulation.
Suppose they argued, in the legislation's preamble, that micro-
organisms carried in cotton posed a health hazard in the climates
of the Northeast. 7 Were Congress to require that the New Eng-
land states open their markets to cotton, or were the courts to
strike down the ban as an unconstitutional restriction on trade,
such action would necessarily involve each in a judgment about
whether the ban was a valid exercise of the state's police power
or was, instead, an impermissible regulation of interstate com-
merce.68 As the hypothetical demonstrates, such a judgment is
not always easy, and we can begin to see how it is that courts
backed into the understanding that the Commerce Clause has a
police power dimension to it.
For legal positivists, making the distinction between state
actions that affect commerce only incidentally and those that are
intended to impede commerce is an impossible task, for legal
positivism deprives its adherents of the tools necessary to make
such a judgment. Since the principle of free trade will necessarily
come into conflict with the state's police powers, the courts are
then left with the unenviable choice between accepting a state's
police power rationale, no matter how great the effect on com-
merce, or striking down even legitimate exercises of the police
power if the effect on commerce is more than minimal. In other
words, the courts are left not with the qualitative inquiry into
whether the state legislation was intended to impede commerce
or affects commerce only incidentally, but with the quantitative
inquiry into how great the legislation's effect on commerce is.
Lest the Commerce Clause be eviscerated, the courts were
then forced to follow the quantitative inquiry, striking down state
legislation, whatever its purpose, if the effect on interstate com-
See note 56.
7 Compare Railroad Co. v Husen, 95 US 465, 473 (1878) (striking down Missouri ban
on importation of Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle because it applied to all, not just
diseased, cattle).
See, for example, Groves v Slaughter, 40 US (15 Pet) 449, 511-12, 516 (1841)
(Baldwin concurring) (arguing in case involving ban on importation of slaves for sale that
the state of Mississippi could ban such importation on grounds of morality or safety-that
is, pursuant to its police powers-but not for a commercial purpose).
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merce was great. A police power vacuum was thus created, and
the final piece of the Commerce Clause puzzle came into view, for
if the states could not exercise their police powers in matters that
had a substantial, though incidental, effect on interstate com-
merce, it must be that Congress had police powers of its own, at
least in areas where it was clear the exercise of the police power
had a substantial effect on commerce.
Thus, Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause were
expansively interpreted to allow Congress to regulate private
behavior that had an effect on commerce.69 Arkes traces the ex-
pansion to a series of laws through which Congress used the
Commerce Clause to ban such things as unsafe food and drugs,
prostitution, gambling, and slavery. "This movement could have
been averted," writes Arkes, "only if it had been possible for the
national government to have avoided taking seriously any moral
questions about the nature of commerce" (p 155).'o Countering
state law impediments would not, in the nature of things, ex-
haust the responsibilities of the federal government in defining
the perimeter of the field of "legitimate commerce" (p 155), ac-
cording to Arkes, since "a state could not preserve the character
of its policy [banning prostitution, liquor, or gambling] by closing
off its borders" (p 156). But Arkes's premise is only true if we
accept the positivist dilemma, described above, that gives rise to
a police power vacuum in the first place. Absent that vacuum,
which caused courts to "back in" to a police power understanding
of the Commerce Clause itself, Congress's power to regulate pri-
vate businesses not engaged in commerce but which necessarily
affected commerce would derive from the Necessary and Proper
6 Arkes recognizes that the commerce power, as originally understood, allowed
Congress to reach only state law barriers to commerce and not private actions that
affected commerce, and he argues that such an interpretation is in accord with the limita-
tions contained in US Const, Art I, §§ 9-10 (pp 150-52). See also Currie, Constitution in
the Supreme Court at 160-82, 209-22 (cited in note 53) (describing the major Commerce
Clause cases of the nineteenth century).
" Arkes suggests that the extension of Congress's power to private actions affecting
commerce was inevitable. Sutherland himself, Arkes tells us, contributed to the rejection
of this distinction between state and private action in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v Journey-
men Stone Cutters' Association, 274 US 37 (1927), where he upheld the antitrust laws
against a union organizing a secondary boycott of a nonunion stone quarry (pp 153-55).
The argument that Congress's power did not extend to private behavior had earlier been
implicitly rejected in E.C. Knight, 156 US 1, where the Court refused to apply the
Sherman Act against a sugar manufacturer, not on the grounds that it was a private
concern, but because it was a manufacturing concern.
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Clause,7' not the Commerce Clause alone. As Justice Black
wrote in Polish National Alliance v NLRB:
The doctrine that Congress may provide for regulation of
activities not themselves interstate commerce, but merely
"affecting" such commerce, rests on the premise that in cer-
tain fact situations the federal government may find that
regulation of purely local and intrastate commerce is "neces-
sary and proper" to prevent injury to interstate commerce. 72
Regrettably, Arkes himself misunderstands the true source of
Congress's power to regulate noncommercial concerns, for he
addresses the expansion of congressional power in terms of the
Commerce Clause itself, or, perhaps more accurately, in terms of
a "general welfare" idea that he thinks must be implicit in the
Commerce Clause. This single misconception creates two prob-
lems in his subsequent analysis. First, it requires him to fit with-
in the Commerce Clause's word "regulate" a moral component
that could limit the exercise of congressional power (pp 130-31).
Such a component is much more readily found within the word
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Second, it masks
the distinction between means and ends that exists between the
two clauses. Ironically, the difference between the approaches
was appreciated by Sutherland himself in Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association,73 and Arkes seems, in
this instance, to have fallen prey to the very error he attributes
to others-failing to understand Sutherland as he understood
himself (p 14). The error does not undermine Arkes's claim that
congressional power over interstate commerce must have a moral
limitation, but it does cause the focus of his argument to be
somewhat misplaced.
The difficulty lies not with a recognition that some goods
cannot be considered 'legitimate" articles of commerce, but with
the failure to recognize that such a determination involves the
exercise of a police power rather than any power under the Com-
merce Clause. The commerce aspect of the problem comes into fo-
cus only when the several states disagree on the police power
issue, for it is then that a ban in one state, through which such
commerce must flow, can impede commerce that other states
have deemed to be legitimate. The "broken package" doctrine
71 US Conast, Art I, § 8, cl 18.
' 322 US 643, 652 (1944) (Black concurring).
73 274 US 37, 46-47 (1927).
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sought to protect the commerce, without itself venturing into the
field of police powers.
When Congress decided to ban directly goods that it deemed
noxious, it moved beyond exercising a Commerce Clause power
and into wielding a police power. It did not ban the goods be-
cause they impeded commerce, but because they threatened the
health, safety, and morals of the people. Congress could only
legitimately engage in such regulation if it was a necessary and
proper means to the end of regulating commerce.' But legal
positivists cannot make the distinction between means and ends
that is necessary to assess the propriety of such regulations. The
price of labor, for example, has an effect on commerce because it
alters the price of goods that move in commerce. That fact, alone,
for a positivist, brings a minimum wage law within the power of
Congress, so long as the declared purpose of the law is to regu-
late the effect on interstate commerce itself.75 Conservative legal
positivists, who would like to oppose the power of Congress to
enact such a regulation of wages despite its effect on commerce,
thus find themselves without an argument on which to base their
opposition.76 Sutherland, in contrast, understood not just that
" As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Carter Coal: "Congress may not use this protec-
tive [commerce] authority as a pretext for the exertion of power to regulate activities and
relations within the states which affect interstate commerce only indirectly." 298 US at
317 (Hughes separate opinion).
"' Some conservatives are even hesitant to inquire into the purpose of such legisla-
tion, at least when not codified as part of the statute itself. See, for example, Edwards v
Aguillard, 482 US 578, 636-38 (1987) (Scalia dissenting); Blanchard v Bergeron, 489 US
87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wallace v
Christensen, 802 F2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir 1986) (Kozinski concurring). Compare Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 539 (1983) ("To delve into the
structure, purpose, and legislative history of the original statute is to engage in a sort of
creation."), with Edwards, 482 US at 586-87 ("While the Court is normally deferential to a
State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose
be sincere and not a sham.").
That view renders meaningless Chief Justice Marshall's admonition a century and
three quarters ago: "[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government,] it would become
the painful duty of [the Supreme Court)... to say that such an act was not the law of the
land." M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 423 (1819).
" Chief Justice Rehnquist has tried to impose a quantitative limitation on the power.
In his concurring opinion in Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,
Inc., he stated that:
[Ilt would be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause is unlimited. Some activities may be so private or local in nature
that they simply may not be in commerce. Nor is it sufficient that the person or ac-
tivity reached have some nexus with interstate commerce. Our cases have consistent-
ly held that the regulated activity must have a substantial effect on interstate com-
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the Necessary and Proper Clause requires that the purpose of the
regulation be a Commerce Clause one, but, more fundamentally,
that the word "proper" implies that even regulations whose pur-
pose is the regulation of interstate commerce might be illegiti-
mate. Conservatives could thus find in Sutherland principles that
would support the ends they seek; they would, however, have to
reject the legal positivism they have adopted since Sutherland's
time, and embrace once again the natural rights jurisprudence
that gives substance to any such "proper" inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Hadley Arkes takes us on a tour of lost territory, a tour that
demands of both liberal and conservative jurists a logical consis-
tency in the arguments they make to further the ends of their
respective jurisprudences. In the course of that tour, we discover
that conservative jurists have adopted a jurisprudence that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the ends they seek. Were they to
again take seriously the jurisprudence of their political ancestors,
including George Sutherland, however, they would find the logi-
cally coherent principles that would support their ends.
Liberal jurists, on the other hand, do not fare so well. Arkes
makes a prediction in the early pages of the preface:
Both conservatives and liberals in our own time have moved
away from natural rights and embraced one version or an-
other of "legal positivism." The consequence is that conserva-
tives and liberals have both produced a jurisprudence for
which they cannot give a coherent moral account. The irony
is that Sutherland could supply the moral ground that is
missing in the jurisprudence of each. But that is not to say
that he could justify the ends that both sides have sought to
reach in the name of jurisprudence (p x) (emphasis added).
mere.... As recently as Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27 (1968), Justice
Harlan stressed that "[n]either here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that
Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities."
452 US 264, 310-12 (1981) (Rehnquist concurring). As described above, however, the quan-
titative inquiry into whether the effect on commerce is substantial ignores the at least
equally essential qualitative inquiry into whether the end of the legislation is a regulation
of commerce or of health, safety, and morals. In other words, Rehnquist's "substantial
effects" test addresses whether the legislation is "necessary," but fails to address whether
it is "proper."
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Throughout the book the strength of Arkes's reasoning makes
clear that although the most important aspects of liberal juris-
prudence rely on the "logic" of natural rights, they are simply
inconsistent with the principles of natural rights. "[T]he right to
an abortion," for example, "can[not] be sustained on any serious
ground of 'natural rights,'" according to Arkes (p xi). And, as we
have shown, the use to which liberal jurists have put the "liberty
to contract" is fundamentally inconsistent, in most cases, with
the natural rights principles on which the "liberty to contract" is
based.
Although Arkes's case for a return to the natural rights prin-
ciples underlying George Sutherland's jurisprudence may be
politically appealing only to conservatives, it is logically compel-
ling, and it should force a reassessment of the inconsistencies
that lay at the heart of the jurisprudence of liberal and conserva-
tive jurists alike. Ironically, the few instances where we disagree
with Arkes's analysis are precisely those instances when Arkes
himself has failed to take Sutherland seriously, but that, of
course, only makes Arkes's defense of Sutherland all the more
compelling.
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